This essay aims at highlighting the linkage between current international banking regulation (namely, that produced by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision) and economic activity, which is proxied by the S&P500 stock market index. It is revealed that the amount of regulatory documents published per year affects stock market performance, but only for the next two years. Discussion on the probable reasons for this is included.
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Objective
Financial crises have often led to changes in regulatory laws and institutions which lead to a significant increase in regulatory documentation output (Barth, Caprio, Levine (2005) ; Bhidé (2009) . Also see Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) ). A large number of documents (guidelines, frameworks, etc.), frequently produced by regulatory bodies in responding to the past crises of 2009-2011, have traced the impact of current regulation on economic activity. Thus far, no existing study has engaged in quantitative analysis of modern regulatory activity through looking at impact of sheer volume of publication, i.e. as measured by the number of pages published per annum. We find a somewhat surprising result through this method:
increased production of regulation leads by two years increased economic activity (proxied through the S&P500 stock index in this concise paper). But once regulation production slows, we find economic activity slows with a two-year lag. We fear this may lead to certain perverse incentives which may result in increased regulatory page production rather than attacking the direct underlying issues.
Because of the novelty of the research issue, we would like to elaborate on what articles drove us to perform the analysis presented herein. We would also note that a traditional structured literature review is not applicable for our case. There were two major streams that impacted us: use of publications and search data.
First, The Economist initiated publication of R-word index series (Economist (2008); Economist (2011) ).
This series signals for the number of times the word "Recession" is mentioned in the Financial Times, The Factiva database etc. The concept is that the R-word index is expected to proxy the probability of a potential world economic crisis (that is, the higher the index, the higher would be the probability of an incumbent economic crisis).
Second, the closely-related domain of "nowcasting" is another area of research which informs our approach. The concept of nowcasting is to use the number of searches for particular terms or data in search engines (e.g. Google) as an auxiliary determinant in economic models (for more information, please, see Choi and Varian (2012) ).
Our paper proceeds as follows: we look at data collection in Part 2, then engage in a primary visual analysis (please see part 3). We then test causality through regression analysis by applying a Granger test (presented in Part 4). Part 5 provides probable rationales for the economic effects observed.
Data
To undertake this research project, two time series of data were collected. As a conventional proxy for economic dynamics (dependent variable), the Standard and Poor's 500 Index (S&P500) was used for the period of 1999-2013. Daily closing prices were averaged to form a yearly number. The website of www.finance.yahoo.com was used as a source for this data.
As for the regulation variable (independent variable), we browsed the website of Basel Committee on It is necessary to state that authors recognize that the data series are short and all econometric implications need to be carefully treated. Still it is important to mention that more granular time buckets (e.g. months and days) were also considered. But because of S&P500 volatility and non-periodic nature of regulatory documents publication, clear patterns of interdependence were not captured at more granular time scale.
One might argue that we analyze variables of different sorts: 'S&P500' is a stock variable (it measures quotes as of particular date); 'pages published' is a flow variable (it accumulates information during the period). From one side, averaging S&P500 through a year enables us to synchronize variables. From another side, it is exactly by essence the problem setting when the flow of publications is expected to impact the level (stock) of economic activity.
Visual Analysis
Figure 1 below presents the dynamics of the two datasets described above: Economic dynamics as proxied by the year-average closing price for the S&P500 index (blue line) and the number of pages annually published by the Basel Committee (red line). We would highlight that Figure 1 presents stock index performance with a two-year lead (inverse to lag).
For example, we show the value for 2011 on the graph which was recorded for the 2013-year S&P500
average. This is made deliberately to show the effect of tight co-movement of the two time series if taken consequently, not simultaneously. For the original data representation (with no shifts and with lagged values also), please consult Appendix 2.
As it follows from Sections 4 and 5 provide justification for this two-year forward shift for S&P500 values. Section 4 gives our econometric rationale, whereas section 5 proposes the economic reasoning.
Granger Causality Test
In order to verify whether the observed dependence between the amount of regulatory documentation published and economic activity holds true, a Granger causality test was run. variables of interest -one immediately and another with some lag. Nevertheless, the test allows one to conclude that one value always precedes another.
Disregarding the limitations of the procedure, the Granger causality test is still the most optimal procedure to test the time series causality. Additional attention only needs to be given when interpreting the results. . This odd result -that a lagging drop in the S&P500 index would result from declining regulatory output -is discussed in the final section.
Concluding remarks on the possible nature of revealed dependence
The current research analyzed the dependence of the existing regulation, expressed in terms of pages of regulatory documents published per annum, and economic activity, represented by the S&P500 index.
Though research limitations are definitely worth considering as we have so done (including a small number of observations, a non-stationary time series, and probable effects of spurious regression), we find strong support indicating that regulatory activity positively impacts economic performance. That is to say, the more regulatory documents are published per annum by the Basel Committee, the higher the value of the S&P500 index one might expect in two years. Although one might consider the observation as generally positive, there are issues which arise. The following list of concerns needs to be addressed by regulators as early as possible:
 Newly-minted regulation, such as monitoring capital adequacy for banks, has a limited life span. That is, its impact fades after a few years and needs to constantly be enhanced.
This indicates the time-limited efficacy of regulation.
 This time-limited efficacy occurs over a two-year period, but increasing regulation to refresh and recharge an economic boost may lead to perverse outcomes. In particular, the more regulation issued increases banking transaction costs, and the more restricted the financial area becomes.
 One way to interpret this time-limited efficacy is to ask whether new regulation merely prevents economic agents from extra risk-taking until they manage to adapt (An apt analogy might be the case of penicillin medicine, which lost efficacy after it was discovered in 1928 as the virus required much less time to adapt to new modifications in penicillin formula composition than it did a century ago).
 The unfortunate outcome of such behavior is the constant rise in the number of regulatory documents. If our model is correct then, to sustain economic growth and resilience in the future, more and more regulatory documents need to be published. Any slowdown might result in a crisis, as during the slowdown in regulatory publications, economic agents that are by nature self-adapting would find solutions to benefit even from enhanced and complicated regulations over a few-year period.
 Besides, following a trend of increasing the number of publications, banking would become an area of precedent law that views financial market as a set of cases, but not as a system. Firstly, such vision might be unfavorable, as it does not consider system-wide counterbalancing effects. Secondly, mastering the current publication volume, now approximately 7,000 pages, is somewhat equivalent to studying for a Master's degree or the Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) program. This extra burden for the economy increase direct transaction costs as noted above, but also forces a banker to spend time studying that bulk of publications.
 Lastly, efficacious regulation should be promulgated independently of the economic environment; that is to say, it is neither impacted by, nor impacts (or in our terms: does not Granger cause, nor is Granger caused by), the economic performance. Otherwise the uncertainty of business activity coupled with environment-dependent regulation, instead of stabilizing economy, would produce an inverse accelerating (procyclical) effect, which was tailored to be avoided. This is analogous to the so-called "cobra effect" described by Horst Siebert (2001) . Siebert described the case that during the Indian campaign, British officers offered one pound per cobra killed, as they wanted the cobra population to be reduced. As a response, locals started breading cobras and selling them to British officers to earn money. In the end the cobra population increased several times, a result definitely counter to the initial policy objectives.
Hence our key proposal is to consider both the positive aspects of regulation production and the perverse incentives unintentionally created when revising (overcomplicating) the overall regulatory framework for the global financial system. There is strong need to simplify regulation and have a clear system for both regulators and regulated agents.
We might visualize such a system as a cross-roads traffic light system where the lights represent guidelines and structures in a global financial regulatory framework. Consider the evolution of such a system. To the best of our knowledge, the very first cross-road light was created in 1868 
